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the Economic Transformation 
of Poland 
Alain de Crombrugghe and David Lipton 
Poland’s budgetary position shifted dramatically from 1989 to 1991. A large 
deficit emerged in  1989, there was a huge  swing to surplus in  1990, and a 
deficit reemerged in 1991. These shifts resulted, first, from the collapse of the 
Communist fiscal system and, then, from the macroeconomic and structural 
forces set in motion by the economic transformation process. 
Poland’s fiscal system, designed during the Communist period primarily as 
an instrument to reallocate  resources, collapsed when macroeconomic pres- 
sures mounted in 1989. The Communist government was unable to cope with 
falling revenues or to reduce sufficiently the budgeted  subsidies and social 
spending, and a large budget imbalance (of about 7 percent of GDP) resulted. 
The deficit was financed by central bank credit, which contributed to an ava- 
lanche of money printing and, by August 1989, an explosive inflation. 
The Solidarity government began the economic transformation by launching 
a program of  stabilization and liberalization  at the beginning of  1990. This 
program produced a huge budgetary correction, about 10 percent of  GDP in 
1990, as the profitability of  enterprises was restored and subsidies were cut 
drastically (see app. table 1  lA.l).  Over time, however, the stabilization correc- 
tion eroded, mainly because the process of economic transformation had unfa- 
vorable effects on the management of the budget. The liberalization of  eco- 
nomic activity produced qualitative and quantitative changes in the nation’s tax 
base and changes in spending priorities. For example, enterprise profits taxes, 
which had been a major source of revenues, fell as a result of the decline of 
the state enterprise sector. In addition, pressure mounted for improvements in 
public services and increases in social safety net spending. 
At  the same time, budget management has been constrained by  financial 
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realities. Since the economic transformation began, the government’s room to 
maneuver has been restricted by  the need to avoid budget deficits of a scale 
that would jeopardize the effort to stabilize prices and the exchange rate. So 
far, the government has avoided a budgetary erosion of dangerous proportions, 
although the emergence of a deficit has prevented a decisive victory in the anti- 
inflation battle. The deficit reached about 4 percent of GDP in 1991, and, as a 
consequence, the government was unable to reach its aim of bringing inflation 
down to 1-2  percent per month. Nonetheless, the deficit was financed by the 
banking system without a loss of monetary and financial control. 
With  the  anti-inflation  battle  always  in  the  foreground,  Poland’s  post- 
Communist governments have begun major reforms of the fiscal system. Po- 
land is now creating a fiscal system better suited to a modern, market economy, 
with much less emphasis on directing the allocation of  resources.  The new 
priorities must be to support macroeconomic stabilization and foster the devel- 
opment of  a market  economy.  In time, the reform of  the fiscal system will 
include tax reform, a reevaluation of spending priorities, civil service reform, 
the revamping of social insurance programs, and the creation of a public invest- 
ment program. 
This paper explores the challenge of managing budgetary policy during Po- 
land’s transition to a market economy. The focus is on the case of Poland, but 
much of  what is discussed  has been  or will be faced by  other countries  in 
Eastern Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.’ 
The paper begins with a description of the shortcomings of the Communist 
fiscal system. This is followed by an examination of the effect of the economic 
transformation  on the budget  and an explanation  of  the budget  swings that 
have taken place since the economic transformation  began. The next section 
describes the role of the budget in a market economy and discusses the major 
changes that will be necessary to fulfill this role. Finally, the paper offers some 
comments about how budget targets can be set in the transition to a market 
economy and illustrative targets for the main budgetary aggregates in the short 
and long run. 
11.1  The Breakdown of the Communist Fiscal System 
During the Communist period, the government budget was primarily an in- 
strument for resource reallocation. Under this approach, fiscal policy was used 
differently than in market economies, where policymakers aim to support mac- 
roeconomic balance and to provide public goods. Budget policy under Poland’s 
Communist governments involved the administration of turnover taxes, enter- 
prise profits taxes, tax reliefs, and subsidies to support an extensive system of 
1. For descriptions of  fiscal developments and budgetary  policy  issues in Hungary, Romania, 
and Czechoslovakia, see Boote and Somogyi (1991, 21-24),  Demakis and Khan (1991, 26-27), 
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consumer and producer  price  controls. In  fact, neither  the tax  nor  subsidy 
schemes were fixed regimes (i.e., with established parameters on which eco- 
nomic agents can base their decisions), as is the case in the West. In practice, 
taxes and subsidies were negotiated, with enterprises seeking to achieve their 
desired level of  post-tax-cum-subsidy profits and the government  seeking to 
maintain price controls and clear commodity markets2 
Although  Poland’s governments  had  sought  other  budgetary  objectives, 
maintaining macroeconomic balance was not among them. The tax system was 
managed to achieve incomes policy objectives, targeting the growth of  state 
enterprise wages and then using these wages as the base for social insurance 
benefits and government-sector wages. Although the state investment budget 
included some infrastructure projects executed by  government  ministries, it 
was designed primarily to channel resources to state enterprises, to support 
their industrial investment projects and profitability. 
Thus, a complicated network of resource transfers rested on a shaky founda- 
tion, Poland’s very narrow tax system. The tax system relied primarily on turn- 
over taxes and the enterprise profits tax (see app. table llA.2). These two taxes 
provided revenues of about 23 percent of GDP in the mid-l980s, roughly two- 
thirds of all state budget revenues. Most of the turnover-tax revenues were from 
three products (gasoline, alcohol, and tobacco), and the base was not broad; in 
fact, exemptions were plentiful. 
The macroeconomic effects of budget policy on aggregate demand were not 
given much consideration. This was possible because the prevalence of price 
controls and  subsidies bottled  up domestic imbalances  and  the  lack of  ex- 
change rate convertibility restricted the spillover of imbalances into economic 
relations with the rest of the world. When the macroeconomy  started to veer 
off course, budgetary policy was not adju~ted.~  During the buildup of the im- 
balances  in  1988 and  1989, real  wages  in state-owned industry rose  by  28 
percent. Since this was far in excess of  productivity  gains, enterprise profit- 
ability slumped. This slump produced a corresponding decline in government 
tax revenues  in  1989. As the revenue  crisis materialized,  spending was not 
reduced sufficiently, mainly owing to an effort to maintain enterprise profit- 
ability and consumer price controls in the face of growing aggregate demand. 
Ultimately, the government was unable to bring about an adequate fiscal 
adjustment.  In  August  1989, the  last  Communist  government  raised  food 
prices by  150 percent. This was a last-ditch attempt to strengthen the budget 
and also to prepare  the way  for a greater role for market forces. Meaningful 
2. Balcerowicz (1989) cxplained that, in Poland, the governmental authorities “heavily tax en- 
terprise gross profits but then channel them-to  a large extent in an arbitrary way-back  to enter- 
prises. . , , The problem is that a great deal of  fiscal assistance flows to enterprises in  financial 
difficulties, and that practically all such enterprises are bailed out.” 
3. Poland’s earlier episode of  macroeconomic imbalances, in  1981 and  1982, led to a harsh 
budgetary adjustment and a sharp reduction in real wages under conditions of martial law. For a 
general discussion of the reasons why budgets in socialist economies turn toward deficit during 
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fiscal adjustment, however, would have required the rethinking of many related 
policy areas-including  consumer and producer price controls and the opera- 
tion of the trade and exchange system-something  the Communist reformers 
were politically and technically incapable of doing. The budget deficit for the 
year was about 7 percent of GDP. Since almost all the budget finance came 
from loans from the banking system, the deficit led to a huge increase in base 
money and fueled Poland's hyperinflation. 
11.2  The Economic Transformation and the Budget 
11.2.1  The Stabilization Correction 
The first Solidarity government launched a stabilization  and liberalization 
program at the beginning of  1990. The measures introduced at that time pro- 
duced a nearly 10 percent budgetary correction that year (see app. table 11A.1) 
and resulted in a surplus of about 3 percent of GDP. This stabilization correc- 
tion resulted mainly from the following four aspects of the program. 
First, the liberalization of economic activity-the  freeing of prices and the 
liberalization of  domestic and international trade-gave  the government the 
opportunity to cut subsidies to consumers and enterprises sharply. With prices 
set by  supply and demand, the government no longer had to intervene with 
subsidies to maintain desired price levels. Instead, enterprises were expected 
to manage their own profit positions. In the course of the budget crisis of  1989, 
subsidies had been reduced to about 12  V2  percent of GDP from the 16 percent 
level that had prevailed in the mid-1980s (see app. tables  llA.3 and llA.4). 
The 1990 liberalization measures permitted a sharp cut in explicit subsidiza- 
tion to about 7 percent of GDP. The effort to slash explicit budget subsidies 
continued in 1991, with subsidies falling to only 4 percent of GDP. 
Second, the stabilization program restored enterprise profitability. The most 
important factor in the restoration of enterprise profitability was the reversal 
of the real wage increases that had occurred in 1988 and 1989. These real wage 
increases were unwarranted  in the sense that they far exceeded productivity 
growth.  To  a  degree,  however, the  measured  increases  in  real  wages  were 
symptomatic of the growing excess of aggregate demand. Wages were rising 
in comparison with controlled prices, but these controlled prices were increas- 
ingly irrelevant, as the availability of goods at official prices diminished. In 
1990, the real wage dropped by 27 percent in  1990 in comparison with the 
previous year. In part, wages fell back into line with productivity, and, in part, 
price  liberalization  led  to  the  comparison  of  wages  with  prices  that  more 
closely reflected the scarcity and value of goods and services. 
Another factor in restoring profitability was the establishment of a unique, 
convertible exchange rate. Convertibility removed the long-standing antiexport 
bias of the old exchange rate system and permitted many Polish enterprises to 
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in enterprise taxation resulting from nominal asset revaluation. The rapid in- 
flation and nominal devaluation (and their effects on asset values) in early 1990 
created taxable profits. In  1990, enterprise profits taxes rose by  4 percent of 
GDP to reach 14 percent, a level that exceeded even those of  the mid-1980s 
(see app. table llA.2). 
Third, Poland was able to reduce substantially its external debt service bur- 
den.  Shortly after  taking  office  in  September  1989, the  new  government 
stopped making interest payments on medium- and long-term external obliga- 
tions and announced its intention to seek a permanent reduction of Poland’s 
debt service burden. Much of Poland’s debt service had been rescheduled dur- 
ing the 1980s, but, in September 1989, the government sought debt forgive- 
ness. In early 1990, official creditors agreed to a generous rescheduling of debt 
service falling due that year and, in early  1991, to  a permanent 50 percent 
reduction of all eligible debt. Poland continues to negotiate with commercial 
bank creditors for comparable treatment of their claims. 
The immediate effect of Poland’s debt service reduction was cash-flow relief 
for the budget and reduced pressure on the monetary system and balance of 
payments. In the short run, the cessation of interest payments permitted Poland 
to reduce debt service payments to $0.7 billion in 1990 from $1.6 billion the 
year before (a reduction of about llh  percent of GDP).4  The rescheduling pro- 
vided relief not only for the balance of payments but also for the budget. This 
resulted from the reduction in inflationary finance that had been funding gov- 
ernment purchases of foreign exchange for debt ~ervice.~ 
Fourth, state budget support for investment reached an all-time low. Many 
investment projects were stopped in 1990, and there were almost no new gov- 
ernment investment projects. Budgetary expenditures for investment, which 
had fallen by  11h percent of GDP in the two years prior to the reforms, dropped 
another lh percent of GDP to about 3M percent (see app. table llA.3). 
11.2.2  The Transformation and Emerging Budgetary Pressures 
The effects of the stabilization effort were not all positive. While the positive 
effects dominated at first, certain effects placed a greater burden on the budget 
from the outset. The sharp decline in production, employment, real wages, and 
retail sales in the state sector depressed the level of tax revenues linked to those 
4. For years, because of earlier reschedulings, Poland had been paying only a fraction of the 
nearly $7 billion of interest and principal falling due. The 1990 payments represented a smaller 
fraction than in earlier years. 
5.  In addition to cash-flow relief, the permanent 50 percent reduction in Poland’s debt burden 
has probably eliminated Poland’s debt overhang (presuming that the debt reduction granted by 
official creditors is followed by  a comparable deal with commercial bank creditors). Had debt 
service merely been rescheduled rather than permanently reduced, doubts would have remained 
regarding the government’s ability to generate the resources for debt service in the future (when 
the rescheduled obligations would  fall due). The risk of  a renewal of inflationary finance and 
renewed balance-of-payments problems would have made it all the more difficult for the govern- 
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activities. Turnover taxes and wage-related taxes combined fell by 3 percent of 
GDP. Moreover, some modest compensation for subsidy cuts was extended to 
the population in the form of incomc support, rising government expenditures 
on health (related to purchases of medicine), and changes in social insurance 
benefits (primarily for housing). 
As Poland’s program of transformation  has progressed,  several aspects of 
the process have had important and sustained negative effects on government 
revenue and have forced the government to constrain its spending tightly. In 
most cases, these negative effects stem from the nature of the post-Communist 
transformation  and are undoubtedly  important  factors in other  countries  in 
transformation. 
Revenues 
The most important development was the reversal of the initial improvement 
of enterprise profits and profits taxes. In  1991, enterprise profit tax revenues 
fell by 71h percent of GDP to a level well below what had prevailed in the mid- 
1980s. With a tax system heavily dependent on this particular revenue source, 
the effect on total revenues was large and not easily remedied. 
The fall in enterprise profits taxes can be traced to three aspects of the trans- 
formation process. 
First, by its very nature and design, the liberalization of prices and economic 
activity exposed the fact that an important segment of Poland’s capital stock 
would prove unprofitable in an environment of market-determined  prices. The 
pattern of capital accumulation had been shaped by central planning and, then, 
supported by subsidies, low energy prices, and the protected CMEA market. 
The low value (and in some cases worthlessness) of much of this capital was 
exposed by the liberalization of the economic environment. Over the long term, 
new investment will lead to a reorientation of the capital stock and will support 
new business activities (for the most part private business activities). New capi- 
tal will provide a basis not only for economic growth but also for the collection 
of  corporate profits taxes. In the short run, however, the fall in the profitability 
of old capital has had a direct, negative effect on enterprise profit tax revenues. 
Moreover, the enterprise profit tax system has not been effective in collect- 
ing revenues from new private businesses. Poland is now accumulating profit- 
able “new capital” in thousands of new private businesses, mainly in the ser- 
vice sector, but also in manufacturing, transport, distribution, and construction. 
So far, however, the share of taxes paid by the private sector has not risen with 
its growing share in total business activity (see table 11.1). 
Second, wage pressures  reemerged in late  1990 and were not adequately 
resisted. As mentioned earlier, the fall in the measured real wage at the outset 
of the program had contributed to the restoration of  healthy profit levels. By 
late 1990, workers began to seek a greater share of these profits in the form of 
wage increases, and state enterprise managers for the most part did not resist. 
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Table 11.1  Poland: Shares of the Tax Burden, 1991 
Socialized 
Sector  Private Sector 
Total sales  12.4  27.6 
Total taxes paid  90.2  9.8 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Warsaw. 
Nore; The data cover the 20,700 largest employers (with 50 or more employees in construction 
and industry and 20 or more in other sectors), and the period is the first three quarters of  1991. 
These data undoubtedly lead to an understatement of the role of the privatc sector in sales (because 
of  the employment cutoff level) and an overstatement of  the share of taxes paid by  the private 
sector (because of tax avoidance by  small enterprises). Figures given are percentages of total. 
managers, there were no effective owners to oversee management decisions 
and no effective resistance to wage increases within the industrial structure. 
The government was aware that the prevalence of state ownership and de- 
centralized decision making would lead to weak control over enterprise costs, 
particularly wages. For this reason, the government instituted a tax-based  in- 
comes policy aimed at curbing wage growth at the beginning of  1990. The 
instrument of  policy  was an excess  wage tax, under which  wage  payments 
above a putative norm would give rise to a tax liability for the enterprise equal 
to several times the excess of wage payments. 
One inherent difficulty with this type of policy  is establishing the level of 
the wage norm. Poland’s excess wage tax was not binding in the first half of 
1990 because real wages remained below the preset norm. This left room for 
untaxed wage increases later on that were not fully warranted by macroeco- 
nomic circumstances or the financial position of particular state enterprises. In 
the second half of the year, when the wage norm was binding in most cases, 
many enterprises chose to raise wages and pay the tax. 
Wages began to rise in the fourth quarter of 1990, and enterprise profits and 
profits taxes began to fall accordingly. There was also automatic upward pres- 
sure on budget-sphere  wages and pensions,  which  were linked to industrial 
wages. The rising trend of wages continued in 199  1. In retrospect, it was unre- 
alistic to place too much weight on a tax-based incomes policy; the incentive 
problems of  the state enterprise sector could not be rectified by  a tax on ex- 
cess wages. 
In fact, the real culprit in the wage saga is the sluggishness of the privatiza- 
tion program. The Polish Treasury technically remains the sole owner of most 
large state enterprises. Of course, the government  no longer has the will or 
the mechanisms to exert direct influence over state enterprise behavior. Until 
enterprises  are  commercialized  and privatized,  industry  will  remain  in  the 
hands of  state enterprise managers and their labor councils, neither of which 
are  subjected to much  outside  scrutiny. In this  transitional  state, enterprise 
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ill-defined motive to accumulate some resources for investment.  The main con- 
sequence of higher profits is higher profits taxes; therefore, enterprise manag- 
ers find ways to spend their resources and avoid profit tax liabilities. 
This failing has had important consequences for the budget and, thus, for 
the management of the macroeconomy. When viewed from the vantage point 
of the consumer, wage growth in 1991 does not seem excessive, as it was only 
slightly higher than the increase in the consumer price index. When viewed 
from the vantage point of  enterprise profitability, however, the situation was 
actually grave. Wages rose by  24 percent more than producer prices in 1991 
and contributed to the sharp fall in profitability in that year.6 
The third blow to profit tax revenues was the scrapping of the CMEA (Coun- 
cil for Mutual Economic Assistance) trading system at the end of  1990. Under 
this system, the Soviet Union and the East European countries had exchanged 
goods on the basis of a clearing arrangement denominated in the unit of  ac- 
count called transferable rubles. The decision to end this system coincided 
with a crippling balance-of-payments crisis in the Soviet Union, related to the 
collapse of  its political and economic system. In the midst of the crisis, the 
Soviet Union was unable to provide an effective foreign exchange system or 
payments mechanism for its enterprises. Thus, trade between Poland and the 
Soviet Union collapsed, as did trade between the Soviet Union and the rest 
of  Eastern Europe. Poland’s exports to the Soviet Union under the clearing 
arrangements fell by  92 percent in 1991 (as only transitional transactions oc- 
curred as the system was wound up), and very little of the trade was converted 
to a hard currency basis.’ 
The Soviet trade shock brought on a profound collapse of profits and profits 
taxes in Polish industry. The principal effect of the trade collapse was the sharp 
drop in the demand for exports from those enterprises with traditional links to 
the Soviet economy. The effect on the enterprise sector was broader, however, 
because real zloty input prices (for oil, natural gas, electricity, and iron ore) 
rose universally. This increase in input costs need not have been borne entirely 
by  profits, for the real product wage could in principle have fallen to absorb 
part of the shock. But, as mentioned above, the real product wage rose sharply, 
and, as a result, enterprise profits and profits taxes declined sharply for much 
of the Polish state enterprise sector in 1991.8 
Another feature of the transformation that lowered budget revenues was the 
sharp reduction in import tariffs that constituted part of the strategy to liberal- 
ize external trade. Tariff revenues fell in early 1990, fortunately coming at a 
6. Consumer prices rose by 60 percent in 1991, while producer prices rose by 36 percent. The 
difference is accounted for by the sharp increase in the relative price of services. 
7. For a description of trade developments with the former CMEA countries and an analysis of 
the quantification of trade between Poland  and the Soviet Union, see Rodrik (chap.  18 in this 
volume). 
8. For a detailed analysis of the effects of the CMEA collapse on Polish industry, see Berg and 
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time when the budget had been strengthened by the stabilization correction. 
The tariff system was revamped in July 199  1, and tariffs were set at an average 
level of about 15 percent. Revenues in  1991 were 1.7 percent of GDP, down 
about V2- 1 percent of GDP from the mid- 1980s. 
The privatization  program,  on the  other  hand,  was  expected  to  provide 
greater support for the budget. Little was expected from this source in 1990 
because it was necessary  to put privatization  legislation through Parliament 
and design a privatization program before collecting revenues. The program 
was expected to be under way in 1991, however, so the 1991 budget included 
an estimate of Z1  15 trillion  (about  1.5 percent of  GDP) from privatization 
revenues. The privatization effort was intended to include many components, 
including initial public offerings (IPOs) and auctions of shares for individual 
enterprises, a mass privatization program to distribute ownership claims to the 
population via investment funds, and a sectoral privatization program aimed at 
the restructuring and sale of enterprises in key industrial sectors. The elements 
of the privatization effort that were expected to provide revenues for the state 
were the sale of enterprises through IPOs and auctions. In the end, these two 
elements turned out not to be practical avenues for privatization, and revenues 
turned out to be well below initial expectations. 
Expenditures 
The most important change in the pattern of budget expenditures arising 
from the economic transformation is in the area of social safety net spending. 
Unemployment, virtually unknown in Poland before 1990, rose steadily after 
the program began in 1990. An extrabudgetary labor fund was created to ad- 
minister an unemployment scheme and a job retraining and relocation  pro- 
gram. The government initiated the unemployment scheme with high replace- 
ment  rates  (70 percent  for the  first  three  months),  no  time limitations on 
benefits, and broad eligibility criteria. In 1991, the expenditures of the labor 
fund rose to 1.4 percent of GDP, as the rate of unemployment rose to 12 per- 
cent by  the end of  the year (see app. table  llA.5).9 Unemployment  should 
decline over the course of the transformation, but, as in any market economy, 
frictional  unemployment  will  remain,  and  an  appropriate  social  insurance 
scheme must be maintained. 
Social security benefits paid by the social insurance funds-sickness,  mater- 
nity and family benefits, and pensions-also  increased sharply. This resulted 
mainly because the government inherited from the Communist period a social 
9. Group layoffs from state enterprises account for less than 25 percent of the registered unem- 
ployment in 1990 and 1991. The rise in registered unemployment was probably accelerated by the 
fact that the initial unemployment benefit scheme adopted in  1990 was generous and did not have 
as eligibility criteria that individuals were job leavers or were engaged in an active job search. In 
early 1992, the scheme was revised, benefit eligibility was limited, and the government began to 
strike individuals from the unemployment rolls (for further discussion of this subject, see Berg 
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security system with comprehensive and universal benefits. In time, this system 
must be reformed to make it suitable to the conditions of a market economy 
and sustainable from a fiscal point of view. In the first two years of the eco- 
nomic  transformation,  however,  the  government  attempted to maintain  the 
comprehensiveness of the social security benefits carried over from the Com- 
munist period. Where real benefits had been allowed to erode through the lack 
of inflation adjustment, the government revalued benefit packages. Where the 
link of pensions to the average industrial wage had been allowed to slip, the 
government restored a stronger link. Expenditures of the two social insurance 
funds rose to 14.2 percent of GDP in  1991 from 10.7 percent of GDP in 1989. 
Rising public expectations about social insurance benefits have made it diffi- 
cult to contain benefit levels and the scope and coverage of benefits. 
11.3  The Budget in a Market Economy 
As Poland’s market economy takes hold, the government will have to reas- 
sess its role in Polish economic life. There is a continuing demand for modern 
and effective public services. In addition, the social insurance system is facing 
mounting demands from many segments of the population asking for greater 
income support and social protection.  As mentioned  earlier, unemployment 
benefits  will remain a permanent  feature of  Poland’s market economy, even 
after the temporary budget burden of transitional unemployment has passed. 
In addition, new demands for budget resources will arise from the need to 
overcome the heritage of the Communist system. To  meet them, the govern- 
ment  will  have  to reform  its  own  administration  and  trim  the  size  of  the 
overstaffed civil service. At the same time, the government will have to revamp 
the civil service wage structure to overcome the heritage of egalitarianism and 
to attract qualified staff. In addition, the government will have to develop a 
public investment program to build a modem infrastructure, clean up the envi- 
ronment, and recapitalize the banking system. 
To create a revenue base that will make all this possible, Poland will need 
to complete the ambitious tax reform agenda that has already been drawn up. 
Finally, the tax  system will have to be supported by an improved system for 
budget finance that removes the dependency of the budget on banking system 
credit. The following subsections describe briefly these long-run imperatives 
of budgetary reform. 
11.3.1  The Public Investment Program 
To modernize its infrastructure, which at present is not adequate for a grow- 
ing, capitalist  economy, Poland  must  develop a public  investment program. 
Billions of dollars of investment are required to upgrade transport and commu- 
nications systems alone. In addition, the Communist economy produced exten- 
sive environmental degradation, which has led to adverse effects on health and 
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vary, but  they  range  as high  as the Ministry  of  Environment’s  estimate  of 
$260 billion. 
The abundance of public  investment  needs and the shortage of budgetary 
resources mean that public investment criteria, now virtually absent, must be 
developed. The many potential projects must be evaluated and compared, and 
a selective public investment program must be drawn up that is based on a 
careful assessment of rates of return. In all likelihood, public investment ex- 
penditures in the state budget will have to rise from about 2 percent at present 
to 6-7  percent of GDP.’O This range would not be atypical for a country with 
a similar income level (even ignoring Poland’s particular environmental prob- 
lems). The financial implications of boosting the level of public investment by 
this magnitude will be discussed in the section on budget finance. But it is 
clear that a sustained increase in public investment can be managed only by 
some combination of an improvement in government savings, domestic bond 
finance, and substantial recourse to external finance. 
Unfortunately,  Poland, like other countries in the region, does not have a 
tradition of  a well-defined public  investment program based  on sound eco- 
nomic selection criteria. In the Communist past, investment expenditures  in 
the state budget were devoted only in part to building infrastructure and more 
often to channeling  resources  to particular  industries and sectors to finance 
enterprise investments. In fact, no distinction was drawn between the provision 
of public goods and private goods in the selection of state-funded investment. 
Moreover, when the state has chosen to fund investments, there have been no 
clear and acceptable procedures for the evaluation of the return on these invest- 
ments. Interestingly, in 1990, when the new government considered which of 
the unfinished  investment projects to complete, the only data available  were 
the nominal amounts spent to date (without correction  for inflation) and the 
total expenditures  required for completion. No rate-of-return calculations were 
made at the outset, nor were calculations made regarding the return on project 
completion. In order to develop an effective public investment budget with an 
adequate spending level, the government must develop investment evaluation 
rules that are based on concepts of public goods provision and appropriate rate- 
of-return requirements. 
11.3.2  Commercial Bank Rehabilitation 
Poland will probably have to recapitalize some of its state commercial banks 
in order to privatize  them. Attempts  to privatize banks that do not  have an 
adequate capital base may prove impossible  and will certainly not lead to a 
strong banking system. Thus, recapitalization will have to come first. If this is 
carried out in connection with privatization, the budgetary  contribution will 
10. Public investment by  local and municipal authorities amounted to about  I  percent of GDP 
in  1991. General government investment of 6-9  percent of GDP is in line with what is found in 
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not be wasted by a continuation of  inappropriate state enterprise management. 
The budgetary burden of the recapitalization is likely to be modest, but not 
inconsequential. The government is now in the process of preparing nine large 
state commercial banks for privatization. The banks have been  audited, and 
estimates of bad loans in their portfolios range from 10 to 30 percent. Nonethe- 
less, the financial position of the banks is still in flux because the underlying 
condition of the state enterprise borrowers has not stabilized. Thus, the market 
value of these banks is not yet known and will not be known until the large 
state enterprises  are either closed or privatized. When  the state commercial 
banks are privatized, some estimation of their market value will emerge, but 
in all likelihood certain banks will not have an adequate capital base to make 
privatization possible. 
Recapitalization  could  take  many  forms, but  one  illustrative  possibility 
would be to place government bonds at these banks to strengthen their assets 
positions. In this case, the annual budgetary effect of the recapitalization effort 
would be the interest burden of the bond placements. The domestic portfolio 
of the banking system stood at Zl 170 trillion at the end of 1991 (or about 18 
percent of GDP). A recapitalization effort equivalent to only 10  percent of this 
portfolio would involve the placement of bonds of about 1.8 percent of GDP. 
The magnitude of the interest burden  stemming from bond  placements of  a 
recapitalization  would  depend on interest rate developments. If  stabilization 
efforts succeed in bringing the interest rate down to 25 percent per annum, the 
recapitalization could add Z14  trillion (or Yz percent of GDP) to budget expen- 
ditures. 
1  I .3.3  Social Spending 
Poland has begun to reform its social insurance system, which was designed 
during the Communist period and, thus, embodied the strong Communist pref- 
erence for care for the social needs of all citizens. Polish society continues to 
place a high priority on the government’s role in social support, but this priority 
must now be weighed against others. In the coming years, the government may 
want to shift its emphasis away from the “care” of social needs and toward the 
creation of “opportunities” for the Polish people. This will require less support 
in the form of social insurance and more support for education and the creation 
of human capital. Moreover, the development of the market economy will re- 
quire that social insurance spending be sustainable from a fiscal point of view 
and be structured so as to minimize the disincentives and distortions for the 
population. 
11.3.4  Tax Reform 
Poland has begun a process of fundamental  tax reform.”  The reform has 
several aims. First, the new tax system will be less distortionary,  mainly  be- 
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cause the selectivity and exemptions of the old tax system will be replaced by 
broadly based taxes. Second, the new tax rates and tax bases will be sufficient 
to generate the revenues needed  to support an acceptable level of  spending. 
This is of paramount importance in light of the many competing demands for 
government resources and the need to limit budget deficits to levels that can 
be financed in a noninflationary  manner. Third,  the new tax  system will be 
more fair. Private and state enterprises will be treated alike, and all individuals’ 
incomes will be treated uniformly under the personal income tax. 
In brief, the taxes inherited  from the Communist period  will be replaced 
with several broadly based taxes modeled on Western tax systems. In January 
1992, the government  introduced  a personal  income tax, expected  to raise 
about 5Y2 percent of  GDP in revenues. A value-added tax has been designed 
to replace the selective turnover-tax system, but it has not yet been passed by 
Parliament because of political conflicts over the question of whether construc- 
tion and agricultural value added should be exempt. In the meanwhile, the base 
for the turnover tax has been broadened as a stopgap measure. The reformed 
company profits tax is now comparable to those used in the West. 
The authorities expect that the introduction  of  the new  taxes will in time 
lead to a substantial recovery of tax revenues as a fraction of GDP. In the short 
run, however, there will be an inevitable loss of revenues, stemming from the 
difficulties of  taxpayer education  and tax  administration.I2 The personal  in- 
come tax administration relies on a system of estimated tax payments to collect 
revenues from the hundreds of thousands of new, private businesses. The pro- 
cedures are unfamiliar in the Polish context and difficult to enforce. 
11.3.5  Budget Finance 
The main source of budget finance in Poland has been credit from the bank- 
ing system, which has led for the most part to the monetization of budget defi- 
cits. An important goal of budget policy, therefore, will be to limit the reliance 
of the budget on the banking system to amounts of  credit that are consistent 
with low rates of inflation, declining in time to European levels. Because the 
economic transformation relies so heavily on the maintenance of a stable mac- 
roeconomic climate, its success depends on giving the inflation goal top prior- 
ity and shaping budget deficit targets accordingly. 
At the end of  199  1,  high-powered money in the banking system amounted 
to Z1 89  trillion, or about $8 billion. To bring the rate of inflation down toward 
European levels (or at least to the neighborhood  of  10 percent per annum), 
high-powered money could be allowed to grow by about Z1 9 trillion, or about 
1 percent  of GDP, per year to accommodate the rise in nominal money de- 
12. A recent journalistic  account quoted the head of  Poland’s tax inspection office, who ex- 
plained that he was ‘‘still trying to figure out all the ways that people can evade [the new personal 
income tax]. I don’t think we will replenish the budget overnight. Germany has 11,000 tax inspec- 
tors, France has 16,000,  and Poland has 1,524” (Battiata 1992). 124  Alain de Crombrugghe and David Lipton 
mand.” Setting the amount of banking system credit granted to the government 
with this limitation in mind will make the low inflation target attainable. 
This does not imply that the budget deficit  must be limited by  the credit 
available from the banking system. In light of Poland’s investment and environ- 
mental cleanup requirements  and the need for improved public services and 
social insurance benefits, over the next several years the government may need 
to accept budget deficits that exceed the amount of credit from the banking 
system. The first step toward  making this possible  is to develop a domestic 
bond market. 
To  date, Poland does not have a functioning bond market. The government 
issued bonds in late  1989 as it attempted to reduce the inflationary  effect of 
the budget deficit in preparation for the introduction of the Balcerowicz pro- 
gram. At that time, inflation was running at more than 20 percent per month, 
and there were great uncertainties about the government’s ability to introduce 
a suitable economic program. The bonds carried very high yields to maturity 
(to improve their acceptability), and the government incorporated conversion 
options, under which the bonds could be used to buy assets in future priva- 
tizations and to pay future taxes. In the end, the bond sale amounted to only a 
small fraction of  1 percent of GDP, and the instruments did not provide a suit- 
able basis for establishing  a functioning domestic  bond  market.  Since mid- 
1991, the central bank has begun to create a market for short-term Treasury 
bills that it auctions to commercial banks as an instrument for monetary ab- 
sorption. Although this instrument represents an improvement in the manage- 
ment of monetary policy, its use has been limited, its term is four to twenty- 
six weeks, and the bills are held only by commercial banks. 
It should be possible for the government to issue longer-term bonds-with- 
out conversion  options or other novelties-that  can be  sold to the nonbank 
public and form the basis for a domestic bond market. This should be achiev- 
able, given the low initial level of  domestic government debt and the lack of 
financial assets for the nonbank public (i.e., alternatives to savings deposits in 
state commercial banks). There should be little difficulty or fiscal risk in selling 
bonds equivalent to 1-2  percent of GDP per year, as is done in many other 
countries around the world. After all, provided that economic growth in Poland 
resumes at even a modest rate, borrowing  on this scale would not lead to a 
rising debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Budget finance could also be augmented from foreign funds. Uncertainties 
regarding Poland’s economic prospects  will probably continue to restrict ac- 
cess to commercial credits in the West in the coming years, and access will 
improve only gradually. Therefore, Poland’s external borrowing strategy may 
have to focus on multilateral and bilateral official credits, such as World Bank 
13. Of course, if inflation were brought down to a low level, the real dcmand for money might 
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loans to support sectoral adjustment efforts, the public investment program, 
and the environmental cleanup activities. 
Quantitatively, the most important potential source of external finance may 
be export credits and credit guarantees from Western export credit agencies. 
Poland  already has commitments from Western governments  for  credits ex- 
ceeding $8 billion, very little of which has been used to date. And it is likely 
that  additional  commitments  could  be  secured  from Western  export credit 
agencies because of their desire to support the exports of their domestic com- 
panies. To  date, there have been  many obstacles to the utilization  of  export 
credits, including the reluctance of the government to guarantee state enter- 
prise borrowing for projects of uncertain return. Moreover, few export credits 
have gone to support the budget because of  the paucity of  capital import re- 
quirements among the investment expenditures included in the state budget. 
During the transition  to a market economy, it should be possible to make 
much greater use of  export credits for budget support. An ambitious public 
investment program would increase the scale of capital imports by the public 
sector. But more important, the government can channel to the budget much of 
the finance extended by export credit agencies in connection with nongovern- 
ment imports. The government can assist Polish enterprises in importing capi- 
tal equipment  from the West to obtain export credits but also require that a 
large portion of  the imports be paid for by these enterprises out of their own 
funds. In essence, by not passing along foreign finance to Polish importers, the 
finance can be diverted to support the budget. 
11.4  Targets for Budgetary Aggregates 
11.4.1  The Long Run 
An illustration of long-run budgetary targets can give an idea of the direction 
and magnitude of the budgetary changes still required in Poland over the com- 
ing decade.  Of  course,  future policy choices  and macroeconomic  develop- 
ments will have a direct bearing on the desirability of  any particular budget 
target. Nonetheless, this subsection presents a view intended to take into ac- 
count the many  demands for budgetary  resources  and financing  constraints 
facing the government. 
First, it will be necessary to boost government revenues to the neighborhood 
of 30 percent of  GDP (see table 11.2).14  This level of revenues is lower than 
what  was  consistently  collected  by  the  state budget  in  the  mid-1980s  and 
14. The numerical examples that follow refer to the state budget and exclude the extrabudgetary 
funds and local governments. It is presumed that the division of responsibilities between the state 
budget and the extrabudgetary funds and local governments is not changed again, that the extra- 
budgetary funds are placed on a self-sustaining basis, and that the local government budgets are 
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Table 11.2  Poland: Budget Aggregates 
1991  Target Budgct 
Revenues  23.4  30.0 
Current spending  24.9  27.0 
Investment  I .9  6.0 
Surplus (minus indicates dcticit)  -3.3  -3.0 
Government saving  -1s  3.0 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Warsaw. 
Note: Figures given are percentage of  GDP. 
would represent a scaling back of government claims on the resources of the 
economy.Is However, revenue levels of even 30 percent of GDP will represent 
a substantial recovery from the 1991 level of 23 percent of GDP. A recovery 
of revenues of this scale is necessary to support the expenditures that Poland 
will need to make. This should be possible once tax reform is complete and 
transitional losses have been overcome. Moreover, the intrusion of government 
via the tax system will be greatly reduced in comparison with the Communist 
period because tax reform will eliminate most of the arbitrariness and selectiv- 
ity of the tax system. 
Second, current expenditures will have to be kept to about 27 percent  of 
GDP. This limit would represent a decline in expenditures of about 8 percent 
of GDP compared to the mid- 1980s but is consistent with the reorientation of 
government activity away from subsidization and resource reallocation.  The 
need to improve education and health services, to raise civil service salaries, 
and to reform social safety net programs will make this limit difficult to attain. 
On the other hand, this level would represent an increase in current spending 
of more than 2 percent of  GDP in comparison with the compressed spending 
level experienced in 199  1. 
Achieving these targets for revenues and current expenditures would reverse 
the pattern of government dissaving that emerged in 1990 and 1991. The main 
reason to aim for government savings of about 3 percent of GDP is to provide 
the resources for an enhancement of public investment expenditures. If public 
investment  is boosted  to  the  neighborhood  of  6 percent of  GDP,  half  the 
amount could be financed by  government saving and the rest by  government 
borrowing. As  argued above, the Polish government need not attempt strictly 
IS.  Total revenues of  the state budget averaged about 39 percent of GDP over the period 1983- 
86 and then declined to about 35 percent of GDP over the period 1987-88.  To  compare these data 
with the target proposed in the text, it is necessary  to adjust for the fact that, in the  1980s, state 
budget  revenues  included certain  funds that were collected by  the state and then  transferred to 
local governments. Beginning in 1991, local governments were allowed to retain revenues to cover 
local expenditures, and in that year these governments retained revenues  of  about 3'/2  percent 
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to balance  the budget in  the next decade. There are limits, however, to the 
amount of budget  finance that can be achieved in a noninflationary  manner, 
and there are limits to the amount of public debt that can be taken on. It is 
reasonable that the government could run budget deficits of about 3 percent of 
GDP over the coming decade without adverse consequences. Domestic bank 
credit, domestic bond sales to the nonbank public, and foreign credits could 
each provide finance equivalent to about  1 percent of GDP. 
11.4.2  The Short Run 
The transition to a sustainable budget position  is proving difficult for Po- 
land. As these difficulties stem from the nature of the transformation process, 
the Polish  experience  may be  instructive  for other countries attempting the 
transformation to a market economy. 
For some years, revenues are likely to remain below an acceptable long-run 
target.  The revenue  base  remains  weak  because  the  state sector remains  in 
crisis and the private sector has not yet become the predominant force in many 
areas of  the economy. And revenue collection remains weak because tax re- 
form is not yet complete and will involve transitional revenue losses and be- 
cause tax administration is still being improved. 
Similarly, expenditures are difficult to control during the transition. Some of 
the remnants of the old system, such as subsidies, have not been fully jetti- 
soned. Some elements of the economic transformation, such as the transitional 
surge in unemployment, place temporary burdens on the budget. And the pop- 
ulation  is eager for rapid improvements in public services and expanded so- 
cial benefits. 
In weighing budget choices during the transition, the government’s financing 
constraints dictate what is an acceptable budget deficit. Budget financing must 
be guided by  the stabilization objective because of the importance of a stable 
climate to nourish the new private sector. To create such a climate, the govern- 
ment will have to reduce domestic inflation toward European levels. As ex- 
plained above, this will require limiting budgetary recourse to banking system 
credit to about 1 percent of GDP. There is some greater leeway in the areas of 
domestic bond finance and foreign finance in the short run. Domestic bond 
sales could probably reach 2 percent of GDP or so if a concerted effort were 
made to develop the instruments and the market.Ih Foreign finance could pro- 
vide another 1-2  percent of GDP, combining what might be available from the 
IMF, the World Bank, and export credit agencies. 
The 1992 draft budget has been at center stage in Poland’s political  arena 
for most of the first half of  1992. The government put forward a draft budget 
16. Of  course, domestic borrowing on this scale inevitably  places pressure on the nongovern- 
rnent sector,  by  depriving it  of  much  of  the  available  domestic financial  savings  and, thereby, 
bidding up interest rates. This pressure must bc weighed against the transitional pressures limiting 
budget revenues and elevating budget expenditures. 128  Alain de Crombrugghe and David Lipton 
calling for a deficit of 5 percent of GDP.” This deficit is near the upper bound 
of what might be financed in a noninflationary manner. For this reason, politi- 
cal attitudes toward the draft budget have proved to be a litmus test on Poland’s 
anti-inflation program. 
To reach its target, the government has proposed  measures  both  to boost 
revenues and to curtail expenditures. Among the measures to boost revenues, 
the turnover  tax  has been  extended  to previously  exempted  goods, such as 
food,  clothing,  and  construction  materials.  Modifications  in  social  security 
contributions,  some public-sector  price increases,  and the new  personal  in- 
come tax  are also expected to play a positive role. Among  the measures to 
curtail spending, the revaluation of pensions would be postponed, family al- 
lowances and disability pensions would be restricted, and housing subsidies to 
cooperatives would be cut. 
To keep the deficit below 5 percent  of GDP over the next two years will 
require emergency efforts to boost tax revenues by  several percentage points 
of GDP from the low level of 23 percent of GDP collected in 199  1. Tax reve- 
nues must be raised quickly toward  the level that must be restored over the 
long run. Several options (beyond what is already being proposed by the gov- 
ernment) might be considered. 
One option is to introduce a value-added tax with an elevated tax rate for 
two years or so. The elevated rate would compensate in part for the transitional 
losses of switching from the turnover tax. Another option would be to tax the 
enterprise  sector more heavily. The tax  burden on this sector accounted  for 
most of  the fall in revenues in  1991, and it is doubtful that revenues can be 
substantially restored  unless more revenues flow from the enterprise  sector. 
Recent  signs point  to some recovery  in production  and to continued strong 
exports. Thus, it should be possible to restore in part the tax contribution of 
the enterprise sector, even though important segments of  the state enterprise 
sector remain in crisis. 
In the long run, the answer to the enterprise taxation question is to privatize 
and introduce a new company profits tax. In the short run, the dividenda, a tax 
on enterprise  capital  assets,  could  play  a role.  State-owned  enterprises  are 
prone to profits tax avoidance, which is less of  a problem  with a capital tax. 
The dividenda is unpopular and has been reduced, not increased, in the past 
two years, mainly because it cannot be evaded. The dividenda will be paid by 
healthy enterprises. Unhealthy enterprises that do not pay should suffer sanc- 
tions, in the form of either wage controls or outright intervention. 
On the expenditure side, reducing the budget deficit will require an aggres- 
sive effort to eliminate or sharply reduce remaining subsidies. And social in- 
17. The budget as presented does not take into account the implications of two decisions of 
Poland’s constitutional tribunal invalidating limitations that had  been  placed on  the growth of 
pensions and budgetary-sphere wages in the course of  1991. The effect of these decisions will 
oblige the government to make expenditures equivalent to at least 4 percent of GDP. At present, 
it remains unclear whether these expenditures will be made in 1992 or later. 129  The Government Budget and the Economic Transformation of  Poland 
surance benefits, health, pension, and education must be contained to a level 
consistent with a reasonable budget position, until the revenue system begins 
to perform adequately. 
11.5  Conclusion 
Poland faces the immense task of reorienting the role of government in the 
economy to support its emerging market economy. To facilitate this transition, 
the government will have to support allocative efficiency, invest in and supply 
public goods, and provide an appropriate social safety net. To play these new 
roles effectively will require sweeping tax reform, a reevaluation  of spending 
programs, the development of a public investment program, a comprehensive 
privatization effort, and the development of improved  techniques for budget 
finance. These tasks are being undertaken in the difficult environment of eco- 
nomic transformation. If Poland is to sweep away the remnants of the Commu- 
nist  fiscal  system, it must  shoulder the burden  of  the enduring costs of the 
Communist period  (such as pollution, bankrupt  banks and state enterprises, 
and inadequate infrastructure). This will prove a difficult agenda because, at 
the same time, Poland’s government must fulfill its most important new func- 
tion, to provide a stable macroeconomic environment. 
Appendix 
Table llA.l  Poland: Budget Summary, 1987-91 (in percentage of GDP) 
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32.5  22.8 
6.5  6.6 
14.0  5.8 
12.0  10.4 
3 1.9  27.3 
14.7  12.2 
7.1  3.7 
3.3  4.7 
3.6  I .9 
3.2  4.7 
.6  -4.5 
2.1  -  .5 
...  .5 
44.6  37.4 
41.9  41.8 
2.7  -4.4 
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Table llA.l  (continued) 
I987  1988  1989  I990  1991 (est.).’ 
Financing  .8  .0  7.  I  -2.7  4.4 
Change in arrears  .0  .0  I .9  -.3  .9 
Domestic hanks  .0  .0  5.0  -2.6  4.4 
Other domestic financing  .0  .o  .5  .I  .o 
Foreign financing  .0  .0  -  .3  -.7  -.I 
Other  .8  .0  .o  .7  -  .9 
Sources: The 199 I  Stutisrical Yearbook (j’Pokind and the Ministry of Finance 
“Local government  operations were excluded  from the slate hudget  for the first tinic in  199  1. In 
1991, local government revenues and expenditures amounted to 3.5 percent of GDP. 
Table llA.2  Poland: Budget Revenue, 1987-91  (in percentage of GDP) 
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Tax revenue  3  1 .5  33.4  26.0  30.2  20.6 
From socialized sector  29.3  3  I .0  23.6  28.1  20.0 
From nonsocialized sector  2.2  2.4  2.5  2.1  .6 
Sources: The 1991 Statistical Yearbook cfPoland and the Ministry of Finance of Poland. 
“Local government  operations were excluded  from the state budget  for the first time In 199  I. In 
1991, local government revenues and expenditures amounted to 3.5 of GDP. 
Table llA.3  Poland: Budget Expenditures, 1987-91  (in percentage of GDP) 
1987  1988  1989  I990  1991 (est.) 
Total e.upendirure  37.8  37.0  35.7  3 I .9  27.3 
Current expenditure  32.2  31.7  31.6  28.3  25.3 
Science and culture  .6  .8  .7  .6  .9 
Education  3.6  3.4  4.3  4.7  3.5 
Health, sport, tourism  4.0  3.9  4.2  5.0  4.7 
Adminislration  .8  .7  .8  .9  .7 
Justice, policc, defense  3.9  3.6  3.3  3.6  3.1 131  The Government Budget and the Economic Transformation of Poland 
Table llA.3  (continued) 
I987  1988  I989  I990  1991 (est.) 
Subsidies  15.9  16.0  12.5  7. I  3.7 
Transfers to social funds  I .5  I .5  2.3  3.3  4.7 
Financial costs  .I  .I  I .3  2.0  I .7 
Other  I .8  I .7  2.0  I .2  2.4 
Capital expenditure  5.6  5.3  4.  I  3.6  I .9 
Memorandum items 
Salaries  3.0  3.0  4.3  4. I  4.9 
Sources: The 1991 Statistical Yeurbook of  Poland and the Ministry of Finance of Poland. 
Note: Local government operations were excluded from the state budget for the first time in 1991. 
In 1991, local government revenues and expenditures amounted to 3.5 of  GDP. 
Table llA.4  Poland: Budget Subsidies, 1987-91  (in percentage of GDP) 
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Table llA.5  Poland: Operations of Extrabudgetary Funds, 1987-91  (in 
percentage of GDP) 
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 (est.) 
Total revenues 
Direct revenues 
Transfers from state budget 
Social Insurance Fund 
(of which transfers) 
Social Insurance Fund for Farmers 
(of which transfers) 
State Labor Fund 
(of which transfers) 
Central Fund for Development of 
Science and Technology' 
(of which transfers) 
Foreign Debt Service Fund" 
(of which transfers) 
Export Development Fund" 
(of which transfers) 
Other 
(of which transfers) 
Expenditures 
Social Insurance Fund 
Social Insurance Fund for Farmers 
State Labor Fund 
Central Fund for Development of 
Science and Technology4 
Foreign Debt Service Fund" 
Export Development Fund' 
Other 
Balance 
Social Insurance Fund 
Social Insurance Fund for Farmers 
State Labor Fund 
Central Fund for Development of 
Science and Technologya 
Foreign Debt Service Fundd 
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-  .O 
Sources; The 1991 Srarisrical Yearbook ofPoland and the Ministry of Finance of Poland 
dLiquidated in  1991. 
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Comment  Michael P.  Dooley 
The paper by Alain de Crombrugghe and David Lipton provides a frontline 
account of the enormous difficulties faced by governments in transition econo- 
mies. Their focus on the fiscal implications of the transition is consistent with 
the traditional view that monetary stability is necessary for the transition and 
that the fiscal deficit is the fundamental determinant of monetary growth. 
The transitional “fiscal” problem is easy enough to identify, but I am less 
convinced that privatization and the reform of tax and spending programs are 
an adequate response to the problem. Although their paper provides a valuable 
description of a number of  important determinants of the fiscal position, two 
factors stand out. On the revenue side, the inherited tax system relied heavily 
on a profits  tax  on state-owned  enterprises.  As the central  government lost 
control over the enterprises, labor has protected its income in the face of falling 
output at the expense of profits.  On the expenditure side, reduced  spending 
on price supports and capital expenditures has been partially offset by rising 
expenditures for the social safety net. 
The authors emphasize the positive role that privatization could play in deal- 
ing with the current situation. The revenues from privatization might help bal- 
ance the budget in the short run, but, perhaps more important, private owner- 
ship would provide market discipline for wage demands. The importance of 
better corporate governance is underlined by the access of state-owned enter- 
prises to credit. It is not hard to imagine that, once profits have been squeezed, 
labor might continue to press wage and employment demands, resulting  in 
increased losses covered by borrowing from state-owned domestic banks. 
The difficulty with privatization as a policy response to this dilemma is that 
it is hard to find a case where the pace of privatization is not much slower than 
expected. A part of the problem might be that the central government does not 
clearly own all the property rights that go along with the sale of a firm. 
The enactment of a broadly based income or value-added tax is also a rea- 
sonable policy prescription, but like privatization one that takes considerable 134  Alain de Crombrugghe and David Lipton 
time to yield the significant share of national income needed to match govern- 
ment expenditures. Thus, a significant amount of foreign assistance may be 
necessary in order to reduce the government’s resort to the inflation tax. 
In the interim, it may be necessary to recognize that workers in state-owned 
enterprises are government employees and that state-owned commercial banks 
are a part of the fiscal system. It seems obvious that some restraints must be 
placed on the economic behavior of these institutions during the transition. 
Discussion Summary 
Mark Schaffer pointed out a puzzle in the Polish budget statistics. He noted 
that the payroll tax fell by over a third in  1991 even though real wages rose. 
David Lipton responded  that the  payroll  tax  is collected  primarily  from the 
state sector and that the number of  state-sector employees fell in  1991. How- 
ever, Lipton noted that the decline in workers can explain only a portion of the 
revenue collapse. 
Andrew Berg  asked  whether  the authors’  reported  revenue estimates for 
1991 include arrears. Lipton did not know, but Schaffer said that a quick com- 
parison of the numbers in the paper with the numbers in the Polish Statistical 
Bulletin suggests that the numbers in the paper are actual receipts. Schaffer 
added that there are substantial arrears associated with the excess wage tax. 
Kalman Mizsei contrasted the “bad news” that the Polish government has 
had difficulty collecting taxes with the “good news” that government expendi- 
ture is less than 40 percent of GDP. He said that indirect taxes can be used to 
make up the temporary  shortfall between expenditures  and receipts.  Mizsei 
said that such stopgap measures would be needed only for two years. 
Lipton noted that the government will face difficulty restraining spending. 
He said that social benefits, which were pared back in 1991, could explode in 
1992. The threat  comes from a pair  of  constitutional  tribunal  decisions in 
which  the 1991 cutbacks were declared unconstitutional.  Lipton concluded 
that, if the government can hold the line on spending, then the remaining de- 
gree of freedom will be foreign official finance coming from the World Bank, 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and already commit- 
ted but unutilized export credits. He said that the availability of these sources 
for one or two years might put Poland in a position where some of the longer- 
term adjustments to the budgetary position can take hold. 
Lipton also discussed the government’s labor policy. He said that, in negotia- 
tions with labor, the government should discuss the costs of the high real wage 
instead of publically acting as if Poland does not have a real wage problem. 
He suggested that the current government effort indirectly  to lower the real 
wage with a nominal devaluation will fail because the policy was developed 
without the cooperation of labor. 135  The Government Budget and the Economic Transformation of Poland 
Berg criticized the authors’ proposal that the dividenda tax be used in the 
short run. Berg recommended that a higher payroll tax be used instead. He said 
that  the dividenda  tax  is arbitrary  because  it depends on unreliable  official 
measurements of each firm’s capital stock. 
Lipton defended the temporary dividenda tax. He noted that the dividenda 
tax is nondistortionary because it is based on an input that is fixed in the short 
run. Moreover, he emphasized that the healthy state enterprises are capable of 
paying the dividenda tax  since they have a lot of  financial resources at their 
disposal that they are carelessly spending on excess wage payments and other 
unnecessary expenditures. This Page Intentionally Left Blank